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Abstract 
 
After over 60 years of research and development, AI 
has made its way into mainstream business operations. 
Continuous advances in the fields of machine learning, 
knowledge representation, and logical reasoning are 
expected to result in higher autonomy of AI-enabled 
systems such as Distributed AI (DAI) agents that can 
think and act. The increased agency of the AI systems is 
expected to result in agency risks and the need for 
mitigating such risks through AI governance. In this 
paper, we build on agency theory and identify factors 
that increase the risk of an agency problem between a 
principal (a human or an organization) and an AI agent 
and propose a framework for AI agency problem 
analysis. The framework is illustrated through AI use 
cases and industry examples. Implications for AI 
governance research and practice are discussed.  
1 Introduction  
After over 60 years of research and development, AI 
has made its way into mainstream business operations 
as well as the personal life of unsuspecting individuals. 
According to the McKinsey Global Institute, “it is 
poised to cause the next wave of digital disruption” [1, 
p. 6] and Gartner anticipates that by 2022, AI will 
know more about the emotional state of an individual 
than the people they are closest to. Over 60% of 
personal device vendors will rely on third-party cloud 
AI services [2].  At the enterprise level, innovations 
such as RAGE-AI promise “zero-code, model-driven 
software development using highly abstract 
components, and traceable machine learning” [3, p. 5]. 
As more activities are transferred from human actors 
and code-driven IT to model driven and ML based 
solutions, organizations need to devise new types of 
control mechanisms to ensure that the goals of the AI 
artifacts are aligned with those of organizational 
stakeholders. Gartner makes another prediction, this 
time stating there will be a rise in the percentage of 
workers dedicated to monitoring and guiding neural 
networks, a popular class of machine learning 
algorithms [3].  Most commercial applications of AI 
today are relatively narrow in scope. Image 
recognition, natural language processing, predictive 
models for geological exploration, and generative 
models used for automatic translation are highly 
dependent on their human handlers for data and 
process input, along with model tuning. However, AI 
artifacts are expected to become increasingly 
autonomous, posing the risk of an agency problem for 
users. Increased autonomy of AI-enabled artifacts calls 
for the development of AI governance frameworks that 
would help in the establishment of policies concerning 
the development of AI, as well as the actions of AI 
agents, and guide the monitoring of the proper 
implementation of such policies.  
 
Business Process Management is a diverse research 
field that emerged at the inter-section of three process 
management traditions, the quality control/scientific 
management tradition, the strategic management 
tradition, and the information technology tradition [4]. 
The managerial tradition within BPM research is 
concerned with the alignment be-tween strategic goals 
of an organization and its business processes [4]. As 
managerial BPM research is directly concerned with 
organizational governance issues [10], it is uniquely 
positioned to tackle the issue of AI governance. 
However, our understanding of how BPM can help 
better manage the opportunities and challenges 
presented by the introduction of advanced analytics 
and AI into business operations is still in its nascent 
form. We seek to identify ways in which BPM can 
contribute to AI governance by adopting the agency 
theory perspective [11]. Building on the agency theory, 
we identify factors that increase the risk of the agency 
problem in the organizational use of AI and develop a 
framework for the AI agency problem analysis. Guided 
by such a framework, we seek to identify AI 
governance policies can contribute to reducing or 
mitigating AI agency risks.  
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Specifically, we seek to answer the following research 
questions: 
1. What factors increase the risk of the agency risks 
in organizational use of AI? 
2. How can BPM help address the AI agency risks? 
 
In the next section, we provide a brief background on 
AI, also known as Machine Intelligence, as well as the 
key tenets of the agency theory. We then develop a 
conceptual framework for analyzing agency risks 
associated with the organizational use of AI and 
illustrate it using industry examples and AI use case 
vignettes. Next, we examine how various governance 
policies can be helpful in addressing the AI agency 
problem and identify roadblocks that need to be 
addressed. Finally, implications for AI governance 
researchers and practitioners are discussed.  
2 Theory and background 
2.1 The rise of Artificial Intelligence 
The term artificial intelligence was coined in 1955 
and the Turing test for artificial intelligence was 
famously described in a 1950 publication [4], [5]. Since 
then, the AI field has endured periods of fast progress 
punctuated with periods of relative inactivity as the AI 
community has not been able to meet the inflated 
expectations of its stakeholders [6]. In the early 2000s, 
a confluence of several technological trends led to an 
exponential growth in AI capabilities.  Several 
important milestones followed: the development of a 
self-driving car, increased accuracy of the identification 
of fraud in financial transactions, and the development 
of AI algorithms capable of beating human contestants 
in such games as Jeopardy, Go, and Poker  [7, p. 9]. 
While most currently available AI systems are narrow 
in scope and designed to excel in performing specific 
tasks, significant progress in areas such as 
representation learning, transfer learning, and 
reinforcement learning is contributing to the 
development of Artificial General Intelligence. For 
example, while facial recognition is available today, the 
Deep Learning algorithms can determine anyone’s 
mood based on their facial expressions and actions. 
2.2 Agency theory 
Agency theory was developed as a means for 
examining situations in which cooperating parties have 
different goals or attitudes towards work or risk [8]. It 
has since been applied to executive and employee 
compensation, inter-firm contract design, and more. 
[9]–[12]. At the core of the theory lies the relationship 
between a principal (a party who delegates the work) 
and an agent (a party who performs the work). Most 
applications of agency theory are focused on resolving 
the agency problem, which can arise “when (a) the 
desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and 
(b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify 
what the agent is actually doing” [13, p. 58].  
Governance can be generally defined as a set of 
structures and processes put in place to mitigate the 
agency problem within an organization or a process, e.g. 
to ensure that actors performing specific activities do so 
in such a way as to maximize goal attainment of 
organizational stakeholders. Governance mechanisms 
such as measurement of pre-defined metrics can help 
reduce the agency problem in one of two ways: by 
increasing goal alignment between the principal and the 
agent, or by reducing information asymmetry, e.g. 
making the agent’s actions transparent to the principal. 
Agency theory suggests that certain governance 
mechanisms and contractual arrangements help increase 
goal alignment between a principal and an agent. In 
addition, information systems and task characteristics 
are proposed to moderate the effect of different 
governance arrangements on the agency risks [13].  
Governance mechanisms targeting goal alignment 
include compensation contracts that tie agent pay to goal 
attainment by the principal, e.g., stock options for 
executives or bonuses for sales representatives. 
Governance mechanisms targeting information 
asymmetry include a means for limiting the agent’s 
actions to those approved by the principal through the 
process of formalization and automation. This also helps 
increase the transparency of the agent’s actions through 
management reporting, audit trails, and metric 
measurement. 
2.3 BPM and the Process View of the Firm 
In general, BPM can be defined as an organizational 
paradigm in which organizations are viewed as a 
collection of processes and managerial challenges. 
These are addressed through defining, analyzing, 
implementing, and continuously improving such 
processes. Within BPM, a process is defined as a 
network of activities performed in parallel or in 
sequence to achieve a desired outcome. In structured 
processes, the flow of activities, their inputs and outputs 
are well defined, described in organization-al policies 
and procedures, and enforced through workflow 
automation systems. However, well-structured 
processes are easily imitable and thus cannot be a source 
for competitive advantage [21], [22]. Unstructured 
processes, such as product development or strategic 
planning, are characterized by variability in the flow of 
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activities, expected outputs and available inputs. 
Moreover, the nature of work as well as re-sources 
necessary for accomplishing it are not well understood 
or purposefully kept ambiguous. Instead, organizations 
rely on process participants to search for available (and 
relevant) inputs and devise a way for converting such 
inputs into the best possible output. Unstructured 
processes are not easy to imitate and thus represent a 
more reliable source of competitive advantage. 
BPM practitioners distinguish between 
transactional, development, enabling, and governing 
processes [4]. Transactional processes such as 
production, purchasing, fulfillment, and payroll are 
highly structured and support everyday business 
operations. Development processes such as product 
development and marketing are less structured and often 
generate information that is referenced by transactional 
processes, including product descriptions and prices, 
marketing and recruitment materials, etc. Development 
of human and IT resources is achieved through enabling 
processes, whereas governing processes are concerned 
with strategic planning, as well as risk and performance 
management [4].  
Although activities are the key building blocks of 
processes, BPM is generally less concerned with how 
activities are performed. Rather, it focusses on what the 
inputs and outputs of such activities are, when the 
activities are performed (the flow), and to some degree, 
by whom they are performed (the actors) [23]. Activities 
receive inputs from other activities within or outside the 
process and convert them into output. Such outputs are 
used as inputs into other activities inside or outside of 
the process. Activities consume resources, which may 
include labor, information, or physical resource. 
However, the resources and their types are not well 
defined within the BPM frame-work and the issue of 
resource consumption is not fully addressed in BPM 
research [24]. 
In BPM, actor/roles include human process 
participants, computer information systems and 
potentially organizational units. Actors typically 
perform multiple activities and may be involved in 
several processes, although a certain level of 
specialization among actors is expected. Actors’ time is 
viewed as a resource, and an actor cannot typically 
perform two activities at the same time [24]. In 
structured processes, actors have limited autonomy as 
their actions are either completely predefined (as is the 
case with code-based software or automated production 
processes), or severely constrained by workflow 
management systems. Unstructured processes are 
characterized by high actor autonomy and high agency 
risk. Therefore, actors’ compensation plans are devised 
to ensure that they act in the best interests of the 
organization [18]. 
3 Conceptual framework 
3.1 Agency in AI 
The concept of agency is central to the field of 
Artificial Intelligence. In AI, an agent is defined as 
“anything that can be viewed as perceiving its 
environment through sensors and acting upon that 
environment through actuators” [6]. An agent is rational 
if it selects actions that optimize its performance 
measure given available information. Information 
available to an agent comes from two sources, the prior 
knowledge provided to the agent by its designer and the 
information received by the agent through its percepts. 
A performance measure represents the key mechanism 
through which the goals of the agent are defined in 
relation to desirability of environmental states that result 
from the agent’s actions.  
An agent is considered autonomous to the extent it 
can compensate for partial or incorrect prior knowledge 
by learning from its actions and the percepts received 
from the environment. Therefore, ability to learn from 
its actions and from the data provided by its 
environment is considered a critical part of AI 
capability. Learning can be applied to different 
components of an agent, including the ability to infer 
relevant properties of the environment from percepts,  
resulting in the agent’s own possible actions as well as 
the utility of information describing the desirability of 
world states [6, p. 694]. Consequently, machine learning 
is considered a key component of AI research and 
practice [1]. 
However, the ability to learn and the autonomy of an 
agent is restricted by the variety and format of percepts 
it can receive from its environment. The agent’s 
autonomy is restricted to the extent to which it relies on 
human actors or human-designed processes as sources 
of information. As the agent gains the ability to accept 
and learn from stimuli directly from the environment 
through sensors or by means of computer vision or 
natural language processing, its autonomy increases.  
3.2 AI and the Agency Problem 
As in other types of principal agent relationships, 
agency risks in organizational use of AI stems from two 
sources, differences between the principal’s and the 
agent’s goals, and information asymmetries stemming 
from the lack of transparency about the agent’s 
operations. Therefore, in order to understand the AI 
agency risks, it is important to define what the factors 
are that influence the level of alignment between the 
intelligent agent’s goals vs. the principal’s goals, and the 
level of transparency of AI operations.  
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Regarding AI and Goal Alignment, AI researchers 
and practitioners generally believe that it is possible and 
even necessary to assume that AI artifacts have goals. 
Significant research in the AI field focuses specifically 
on goal setting in AI [14], [15]. A rational AI agent will 
act to achieve environmental states that optimize its 
utility function. However, the agent’s specific goals, at 
any point in time, are also influenced by its knowledge 
about the contribution of different environmental states 
to its utility function [6]. It is presumed that the ultimate 
utility function is defined by the designer of the AI; 
however, the contribution of different environmental 
states to the utility function may be a part of the a priori 
knowledge provided by the agent or by the designer or 
learned through reinforcement learning. In addition, 
agents typically have incomplete knowledge of 
environmental states, and therefore its goals will be 
influenced by its ability to infer the state of the 
environment from its percepts, the use of artificial 
inference. This ability is usually acquired by an agent 
through the process of supervised, semi-supervised, and 
unsupervised learning.  
Assuming that the principal is an organization that 
deploys an AI artifact, its goal can be expected to 
optimize value for its stakeholders. Such a general goal 
is usually translated into a series of more detailed 
objectives that guide the performance of individual 
organizational units or processes. AI artifacts can be 
deployed within a particular business unit or business 
process. Therefore, for the purpose of this discussion, 
we will assume the principal’s goals to be the objectives 
of the business unit or business process within which an 
AI artifact is deployed. We will consider separate 
situations when the same AI artifact is deployed in two 
different processes that have different objectives. 
Let us examine the goal setting process for an AI 
artifact (the agent) in relation to the goals of a focal 
business unit (the principal). It is logical to assume that 
if an AI artifact is developed as a means to support the 
focal process, its utility function will be aligned with the 
process objectives. For example, a robot developed 
specifically for supporting a specific production process 
is expected to help optimize the objectives of that 
process. Similarly, a predictive model developed by an 
investment bank for identifying stock trading 
opportunities is expected to maximize the objectives of 
the process for which it is deployed, and presumably for 
the benefits of the bank as a whole [16], [17]. It is 
important to understand that to the extent to which an AI 
artifact is capable of learning from the environment, it 
is possible that its goals are distorted by exposure to 
biased environmental stimuli. For example, a trading 
algorithm trained on data from value stocks only is 
likely to underperform when asked to trade growth 
stocks or international securities. This introduces goal 
volatility of AI artifacts that are based on online and 
reinforcement learning algorithms.  
It is also possible that an AI artifact is developed by 
a third party and is deployed by a focal unit or process. 
Industry reports suggest that investments in AI are 
concentrated among a group of large technology 
companies and start-ups specializing in AI [1]. Such 
companies have access to the top AI talent and 
technology expertise. In addition, many such companies 
also have access to large volumes of data they collect as 
a by-product of providing their services; along with the 
purchase of data from data append providers such as 
Experian, Acxiom, and the Weather Company. They 
leverage such data for AI training [18], [19]. Therefore, 
it is likely that a large share of AI artifacts will be 
developed by these AI leaders, and deployed by other 
organizations in their business processes [20]. In these 
cases, it is logical to expect that the utility function of 
AI artifacts will be set up in such a way as to maximize 
the value for the company.  
To the extent to which the AI developer is deriving 
value from the sale of the AI artifact, such artifacts will 
seek to maximize the value for its users. For example, a 
corporation selling large-scale AI applications to its 
corporate clients is expected to ensure that such 
applications deliver value for such clients. This is 
usually achieved by re-training a pre-trained model with 
tailored client data. This approach is referred to as 
transfer learning [21]. Organizational research on the 
agency suggests that the efforts of the AI developer to 
customize the AI artifact to the needs of the deploying 
company will be influenced by the presence of 
competition from other AI providers, outcome controls 
on the part of the client, and other factors.  
On the other hand, a seller of consumer-focused AI 
artifacts, such as Amazon Echo or Google Home, is 
likely to configure the utility function of such devices in 
a way that maximizes the value of the provider as well 
as the consumer. One common way in which AI 
providers derive value is by collecting data from AI 
users to further train the AI platform [18]. One could 
expect that once such consumer data becomes less 
valuable [19], other AI providers will seek other sources 
of value such as using their AI to promote third party 
products and services to consumers. Therefore, one may 
expect goal alignment to be the lowest in the case of 
consumer or off-the-shelf AI. 
In summary, the level of goal alignment between the 
principal (an organizational process) and the agent (an 
AI artifact) is expected to vary depending on a variety 
of factors. These include whether or not an AI artifact 
was built by the deploying organization or by a third 
party, along with the nature of contractual arrangements 
between the AI provider and the deploying organization. 
It will also be influenced by whether the artifact was 
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developed for the specific process or for a generic class 
of problems, and by the data used for the training of the 
artifact (see Figure 1).   
 
 
3.2.1. Transparency in AI operations. Concerns about 
the lack of transparency of AI operations lie at the center 
of the discourse about the threat of AI [22]–[24]. The 
lack of transparency can be attributed to three factors: 
(1) computational algorithms and models that are 
difficult to understand/interpret especially as they 
become less stable and more adaptable, (2) lack of 
transparency regarding data sources for AI, especially 
as AI becomes capable of receiving data directly from 
the environment, and (3) the sheer speed and 
computational capacity of AI artifacts make their 
operations virtually impossible to audit. 
 
Traditional software algorithms are designed to 
implement the rules devised by humans. In contrast, 
model-based software is expected to derive its rules 
from the data it is given. Conceptually, data driven rules 
are not new. Complex statistical models have long been 
the basis of many business and engineering applications. 
However, until recently, the models used in practice 
such as decision trees, linear and logistic regression, 
SVM models and case-based learning algorithms, have 
been amenable to human interpretation. Decision trees 
are the easiest to interpret in terms of business rules. 
Therefore, they have been heavily used in processes that 
require a high level of transparency due to regulatory 
considerations. Interpretation of regression models 
requires more extensive background knowledge, but is 
still rather straightforward. In comparison, advanced 
ML algorithms present a significant challenge in terms 
of interpretation. From ensemble models, to neural 
networks, the interpretability of the decision algorithms 
becomes more difficult. In addition, deep neural 
network models are nearly impossible to interpret, 
hence the creation of the Explainable AI (XAI) in the 
LIME project (Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic 
Explanations). Moreover, advanced AI is expected to 
rely on pipelines of models that are consecutively 
applied to data inputs, thus ensuring that such models 
represent a complete black box for its user. Complex AI 
models deliver superior predictive performance, and 
thus are expected to be adopted by organizations 
seeking to maximize return on investments. Yet, black 
box models and algorithms also significantly increase 
the risk of the agency problem.  
The second key factor that leads to the decrease in 
the transparency of AI operations is the ability of AI to 
gather data directly from the environment, without 
human mediation. This ability is fostered by two trends. 
The first one is the proliferation of IoT devices which 
collect data through a series of sensors and share such 
data with other devices in the network [2]. As research 
in multi-agent negotiations advances, AI artifacts are 
expected to be able to broker agreements with other 
devices to access their data. Such agreements are likely 
to be numerous, expressed in computer code, and too 
costly for continuous human oversight. This will lead 
human actors to gradually relinquishing control over 
data access and sharing to AI. The second trend, 
continuous progress in representation learning, 
including image, video and speech recognition leads to 
increasing adoption of AI for data input into business 
processes, and for its use in pattern discovery in diverse 
unstructured data [21].   
In summary, transparency of AI operations is 
influenced by several factors, including the learning and 
decision-making algorithms that are embedded into the 
AI artifacts, the complexity of the AI artifacts, the 
information gathering abilities of the artifacts, as well as 
by the system of explanations incorporated into the 
artifacts.  
 
3.2.2. Analyzing AI agency risk. Combining the two 
factors, the risk for an agency problem increases as the 
levels of both operational transparency and goal 
alignment decrease. The agency problem is the lowest 
in situations where isolated ML solutions based on 
easily interpretable algorithms, such as decision trees or 
logistic regression, are developed in house for a specific 
process task. The agency problem increases as the AI 
solutions become more sophisticated, combine multiple 
deep learning algorithms and are able to receive data 
directly from the environment. Highly sophisticated AI 
algorithms pose an agency risk even when they are 
developed in-house. Such risks may stem from a poorly 
defined utility function or from AI learning undesirable 
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behavior from erroneous or biased data as referenced by 
Cathy O’Neil at a recent TED Talk on introducing 
human bias into objective algorithms 
(https://www.ted.com/speakers/cathy_o_neil). The 
agency problem increases as an organization outsources 
the development of AI artifacts to third parties thus 
relinquishing control over the utility function and the 
training data. To the extent that the sourced AI is 
relatively simple, the agency problem can be mitigated 
through the analysis of the underlying decision models, 
or through output control as in the case with simple 
image and speech recognition applications.  
3.3 Applying AI agency framework to 
industry cases 
Case 1. Anti-Money Laundering and Fraud is a 
significant challenge for many financial institutions, 
with losses amounting to millions of dollars every year. 
The industry standard software and methods in use 
today support the development of rules-based systems 
to catching fraudsters. Business users in financial 
institutions must think about what type of fraudulent 
transaction could take place or have happened in the 
past. They then create training data sets by identifying 
such types of events in historical data, and using 
analytics software to help develop business rules for 
identifying potential fraudulent transactions based on 
past events. These rules are then deployed to screening 
real-time transactions.  Another approach would be to 
allow the machine to sift through the data and look for 
patterns in transactions in real time. The upside of this 
would be that relevant patterns not known before and 
not always detected by humans, can be identified and 
rules can be modified dynamically to account for such 
patterns. Notably, this would reduce AI operational 
transparency and heighten AI agency risk.  
Case 2. Is it really you withdrawing money at the 
ATM? Deep Learning models executed on IBM’s 
PowerAI platform were used in banks in China and the 
U.K. to take ATM camera data, analyze it in real time 
and determine if the user was covering up their face. If 
the algorithm inferred an issue, the ATM would 
immediately shut down and stop all transactions, along 
with contacting the authorities. ATM crimes of this 
nature have been significantly reduced. The case 
involves the use of a third-party AI platform. However, 
the agency risk is mitigated by the relative transparency 
of how the AI artifact is used in a business process. Such 
transparency allows banks to adjust the use of the 
algorithm for locations/seasons when partial face 
coverage is common, as in the middle of the winter in 
Siberia. 
Case 3. A very large airport store with multiple 
locations used IoT video to analyze its customers while 
they were shopping. The ML/DL algorithms were 
trained on the images and classified customers into 
segments, such as a vacation vs. business customer. 
Based on their segment, specific marketing messages 
and selling routines were instituted to increase sales at 
each store. The pilot project was implemented in ten 
stores at an investment cost of $200K per store. The 
average increase in stores sales is $300K per year. They 
are now rolling this out to all airport store locations. 
Again, the relative transparency of the AI operation (it 
is used to segment customers into vacation and 
business) helps ensure that the AI is used in the best 
interests of the business owners. 
 
3.4 Addressing AI agency risks through 
process management 
Both application and development of AI are embedded 
in organizational process, and therefore, BPM methods 
can be used to identify, reduce or mitigate the AI agency 
risks. We propose that BPM approaches can contribute 
to addressing the AI agency risks through (1) explicit 
modeling of activities performed by AI, (2) explicit 
modeling of activities associated with development and 
training of AI, and (3) explicit modeling of the links 
between AI development/training and AI application 
activities.  
 
3.4.1. Managing the use of AI in business processes. 
In spite of their resemblance of a system-based activity, 
an AI artifact is best conceptualized as an actor. In such 
capacity, it can be deployed by structured or 
unstructured processes. For example, image or speech 
recognition are routinely used in transactional processes 
including sales and payment processing or production. 
Increasingly, sophisticated AI is used in unstructured 
processes, from stock trading to R&D [1], [17]. In such 
processes, AI may be used as a tool for assisting human 
actors, or as an autonomous agent. However, the 
distinction between the two is rather diluted, as human 
actors may become complacent and delegate most 
decisions and responsibilities to AI artifacts.  
The AI agency risks increase as more activities 
within a process are performed by AI and thus there is 
less opportunity for human actors to observe the outputs 
of such activities and exert outcome control. The agency 
theory suggests that in the absence of operational 
transparency, organizations are expected to impose 
stricter outcome controls on AI-heavy processes. 
However, this would require management to be aware 
of which processes rely on AI and to what extent. The 
lack of specialized notations for model-based or AI-
based activities makes visualization of AI presence in a 
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process challenging. Another challenge comes from the 
fact that AI components are often incorporated into 
larger third-party software applications. Yet, as the 
number of such components increases, tracing the use of 
AI is the critical step in mitigating the agency risks 
presented by AI. 
Based on the above discussion, we propose the 
following: 
Proposition 1A: Explicit modeling of AI 
components in process maps is associated with a more 
accurate assessment of AI agency risks. 
Proposition 1B: Explicit modeling of AI 
components in process maps is associated with adoption 
of more strict AI governance mechanisms. 
 
3.4.2. Managing AI development and training. Like 
other actors, human or technology based, AI artifacts 
evolve over time. Within organizations, the evolution of 
actors is managed through dedicated business processes, 
including human resource development and IT 
development processes. Simple AI artifacts with limited 
learning capabilities are similar to IT and other 
technological assets that are designed and developed by 
humans. However, the design of AI artifacts is not based 
on the opinions of expert designers but on data. 
Therefore, in representing and managing AI 
development processes, special attention needs to be 
paid to training data, its sources and the governance 
procedures involved in data selection and validation. 
Therefore, it is recommended that processes focused on 
the development of AI and advanced analytics modeling 
be designed and managed separately from other IT 
development processes. Similarly, in the case of third 
party AI, AI acquisition processes may need to include 
activities not typically included in traditional IT 
acquisition processes, such as an audit of data sources 
used for AI training and AI retraining using evolving 
organizational data. 
As AI artifacts develop an increased capacity for 
continuous and independent learning, AI development 
and acquisition processes become similar to those used 
for the management of human resources. Although 
organizations invest significant resources in training, 
such training is only partially responsible for the 
knowledge and skills possessed by their employees. 
Depending on the position, employees are hired and 
compensated for their knowledge and skills acquired 
through their formal and informal education, as well 
their work experience. Furthermore, employees learn on 
their jobs and potentially become more valuable to their 
future employers. In a similar manner, sophisticated AI 
artifacts are expected to come with pre-existing skills, 
be trained for a specific job, and be able to learn on the 
job. Depending on the AI ownership, AI artifacts may 
also be able to switch employers (in case of third party 
AI), and their value is expected to increase with their 
experience. Like employees, AI artifacts are capable of 
transferring knowledge within and outside of the 
organization. Therefore, over time, AI development 
processes need to include such activities as “resume” 
checking, onboarding, and making arrangements for 
non-disclosure of information. Special attention in such 
processes should be devoted to continuous efforts to 
maintain goal alignment through performance 
measurement and intentional retraining.  
Based on the above discussion, we propose the 
following: 
Proposition 2A: Organizations with specialized AI 
development and governance processes are more 
successful in accurately assessing AI agency risk than 
organizations that rely on traditional IT development 
and governance processes. 
Proposition 2B: Organizations with specialized AI 
development and governance processes are more 
successful in mitigating AI agency risk than 
organizations that rely on traditional IT development 
and governance processes. 
 
3.4.3. Managing autonomous AI learning. In a 
traditional approach to business analytics and AI 
development, AI training is a part of development 
processes and the trained AI artifact is deployed in a 
transactional or development process. Data from such 
processes is then fed back to the development process 
for future retraining and re-deployment of the AI 
artifact. In such situations, attention needs to be paid to 
accurately representing the linkages between 
development and deployment processes, especially as 
multiple AI artifacts may be involved and their re-
training needs to be coordinated. As AI’s ability for 
independent learning grows, it becomes increasingly 
critical to trace the environments to which an AI artifact 
is exposed, and to be able to revert to a pre-exposure 
state of an artifact if the exposure results in being 
detrimental to the performance of the artifact.  
Based on the above discussion, we propose the 
following: 
Proposition 3A: Ability to trace AI artifact learning 
through exposure to training data and training 
environments is associated with a more accurate 
assessment of AI agency risks. 
Proposition 3B: Ability to trace AI artifact learning 
through exposure to training data and training 
environments is associated with adoption of stricter AI 
and data governance mechanisms. 
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4 Discussion  
The growth in AI capabilities and their increased 
deployment in organizational business processes 
presents opportunities for increased process efficiency 
and effectiveness. It also creates AI agency risks that 
need to be mitigated through appropriate AI governance 
mechanisms.  
First, there is a need for theoretical and empirical 
research of organizational policies as they relate to AI 
use and governance, as well as on organizational 
adoption of AI governance mechanisms. While some of 
the AI governance policies may apply to all 
organizational processes, some other policies are 
expected to apply to some, but not other processes. 
Regulatory environment is expected to have a 
significant impact on adoption of AI governance 
policies. However, understanding how inherent process 
characteristics are related to AI use and AI governance 
for that process is a fruitful direction for IS research. 
Second, there is a need for the development of 
process modeling standards that would support AI 
governance. Considering the critical role of data in AI 
development and training, it is important to represent 
which process data is used for AI training. It addition, 
increasing transparency of AI operations calls for 
explicit notations for activities that rely on machine 
learning and AI. Finally, there is a need for developing 
standard processes of AI development, acquisition, and 
governance that would take into account the unique 
aspects of AI. IS researchers and practitioners can play 
an important role in developing and evaluating such 
standards.  
5 Conclusion 
Increase in the autonomy of AI-enabled systems 
creates AI agency risks. In this paper, we applied agency 
theory and proposed a framework for the analysis of AI 
agency risks. The framework suggests that AI agency 
risks increase as the transparency of AI operations 
decreases and as the goal alignment between AI and the 
AI agent decreases (as is the case with third party AI). 
We further examined how BPM concepts can be applied 
to analyzing and mitigating AI agency problem.  
The paper contributes to the IS research as it 
highlights the risks associated with AI assimilation 
within organizational processes and points towards 
fruitful directions for future research. Such directions 
include research on AI use and governance in business 
processes, development of process modeling standards 
for dealing with AI-enabled activities, and development 
of industry best practices for AI development, 
acquisition and governance processes.   
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